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Book Reviews

Genetics, Ethics and the Law
George P. Smith, II
Associated Faculty Press, Inc., Gaithersburg, Md., 1981, xiii + 241 pp., $19.95.
Distributed by University Publications of America, 44 N Market St., Frederick,
Md. 21701.
Overview
The advantage of a three noun title is that it concisely states subject area. The
disadvantage is that it says too much and the prospective reader may have a set of
expectations regarding what will be covered while the author actually has written
something quite different. Such was the experienc e of this reviewer. This book
does indeed treat of genetics, of ethics and of the law, but manages to blend them
in an unexpected m anner.
The unwary read er (as this reviewer was) may expect that the "genetics" in the
title refers to curre nt medical genetics - genetic disorders, diagnosis, treatment
and counseling. While the book does not overlook these elements, the major
emphasis is on genetic engineering - the deliberate manipulation of elements of
inheritance by a variety of technologies.
Because the book has a futuristic orientation, the legal dimension of the book
not only reviews a number of court decisions involving genetic disorders, but also
looks forward to wh at the law should be in order to achieve certain societal goods.
Inasmuch as George P. Smith, II, is a professor of law at the Catholic University of
America, with a special interest in the area of law, science and medicine, it is not
surprising that the legal discussions, though brief, are treated more fully than
those dealing with either the scientific aspects of genetics or of ethics.
Having discovere d that the material covered by the book is somewhat different
than his expectations, the reviewer asked himself the question, what are the
author's objectives?
A reading of the author's introduction sheds some light. After making a few
statements regarding the prevalence of genetic disorders, he goes on to describe
the potential role of the "new biology" in treating more effectively individuals
afflicted with inherited diseases. H e sees genetic engineering utili zing a wide range
of techniques to manipulate human genes, e.g., gene d eletion surgery, test tube
fertilization, parthe nogenesis and amniocentesis. He identifies a deep rooted desire
in humans to improve the race. As the means for soci ety to achieve that goal, he
proposes comprehensive programs in eugenics - negative and positive.
Thus, the author writes:
As man begins to induce and manipulate life, he must also begin to question
the limits of free will and of self·determination. All man acquires these
God-like pow ers, h e must endeavor to execute them with a rational purpose
and in a spirit of humanism; he should seek to minimize human suffering.
Ge netic engineering that contributes to the social good should be utilized
fully (p. 2).
Discussion of several possible genetic e ngineering programs will highlight the
important legal and social choices that society must confront as these programs become possible to implant (p. 2).
Gradually a picture emerges: Professor Smith seems very much concerned
about eugenics. A quick glance at the section conveniently labeled "Conclusions"
provides further clarification. There h e states:
Although some assert that eugenic control or controlled breeding is dangerous, foolhardy, destructive of the integrity of the family, and violative of
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the human right to determine the size of the family unit, the unalterable
fact is that population forecasts indicate that the world soon will be overpopulated if appropriate actions are not taken. Genetic planning and
eugenic programming are more rational and humane alternatives to population regulation than death by famine and war. Efforts at fetal experimentation designed to master the genetic code and thus improve the overall
quality of life are to be encouraged and, indeed, valued to an extent beyond
the sanctity of creation (p. 164).
A few more quotations will reflect the author's eugenics orientation:
Efforts designed at preventing the deterioration of human quality, whatever
the causes, made under the rubric of negative eugenics will, perhaps, in the
short run, be more effective and stand a greated [sic] likelihood of wider
public adoption than moves to sustain positive eugenics (p. 11).
A strong enough social policy need exist to justify the imposition of the
parental duty to prevent defective birth by contraception or abortion and to
impose liability for the failure to do so (p. 18).
Imposing a duty on the parents to abort a genetically malformed fetus after
science identifies the malformation is consistent with the social ethic that
seeks to minimize human suffering; it would achieve the greatest good to
society as a whole, for the P1"ospective parents, and even for the fetus [!] (p.
18).
Now the reader begins to perceive what may be the goal of the book: to
promote a program of negative and, eventually, positive eugenics. This he does by
a consideration of the various components which would prepare for, and make up,
such a program. When one examines the various chapter headings and respective
contents, their consistency with the apparent purpose is evident.
Chapter I discusses "Changing Values and Perceptions." Mter briefly reviewing
several genetic diseases and their impact on individuals and society, the author
sta tes that :

I

The social costs of maintaining genetic variation of the types seen previously
is arguably so great and the personal suffering so intense that artificial
selection against them is ethically, as well as economically, the wisest, most
humane and most equitable solution (p. 11).
In Chapter II, "Implementing a Negative Eugenics Program," Professor Smith
deals directly with the manner by which a negative eugenics program could be
realized. The steps would include gen<;!tic screening and amniocentesis, as well as
restrictions on marriage and reproduction.
The third chapter, "Vagaries and Informed Consent," treats the issues of applying informed consent to cases of eugenic sterilization and voluntary sterilization,
and then considers the issues of consent to human experimentation and of fetal
consent.
Chaper IV, "Wrongful Life v. Wrongful Birth - An In Depth Consideration,"
reviews a number of the historical cases which appear to lead up to the situation
where a child may be able to sue his parents for "wrongful life, " that is, for having
been conceived and allowed to be born with a genetic defect.
The fifth chapter, "The New Biology and a Program for Positive Eugenics"
looks at the technology available to implement such a program : artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo implants, and cloning and parthenogenesis.
As the title of the next chapter, "The Legal Response," suggests, the author
considers briefly the judicial and legislative response to cases involving the use of
artificial insemination involving donor semen (AID). These he takes as being representative of the sort of lelial and social problems which the more esoteric reproductive technologies of the new biology (described in the previous chapter) would
encounter.
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Chapter VII, "The Scientific Method and the New Biology: An Overview,"
briefly examines the role of the government regulations in exercising control over
scientific and medical research . In addition to commenting on the role of selfregulations, Professor Smith reviews briefly the federal regulations designed to
protect the rights of human subjects in research. He also mentions the work of the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research [established in 1974, but subsequently and successively
replaced by two other groups: the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (1977), and the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research).
As a means of resolving" ... the rather troubled relationship between ethics and
the life sciences . .. ," the author would" ... promote total cultural revision, or
revolu tion rather than to focus on individual normative behavior." This would
require "the development of contemporary and 'fresh' ethic for the life
sciences ... " (p. 131).
Chapter VIII, "The Bioethical Conundrum: A Consideration in Microcosm,"
examines the interaction of science and ethics. The author urges that a pragmatic
ethic " ... which requires that one make choices that offer a maximum of
desirable consequence, does seem to fulfill the goal of collective responsibility"
(p.146).
The final chapter, "Science and Religion: Compatibilities and Conflicts," looks
briefly at three religious views - the Roman Catholic, the Protestant and the
Jewish - with regard to artificial insemination and sterilization. At one point in
this chapter Professor Smith states:
Churches and religious teachings will either be molded to reflect the new
ethics of the age or will die out (p. 157).
Evaluation
How does one evaluate such a work? With some reluctance I must admit to an
overall impression: this book is a piece of propaganda. It is an attempt to argue
for and promote a cause : the acceptance of a program in eugenics.
The basic thesis of the book is to be rejected. A program of eugenics, negative
and positive, would be inimical to the true well-being of individuals and of
society. The implementation of the eugenics program, as the author describes,
would require, for example, the abortion of defective unborn children. Thus, in
addition to the statements quoted above (his page 18), he writes:
Parents and the medical profession, knowing of the risk of incurring liability
for wrongful life, will become much more conscious of the child's right to a
healthy mind and body and be less hampered with notions of the sanctity of
human life. This will reap benefits for society in that such concern by
parents and medical practitioners will greatly decrease the number of persons dependent on society for their support and existence. The debate
between defects and non-existence will become a matter of the past as
recognition of the right to exist withou t defects becomes accepted (p. 82).
The rights of individuals become subordinated to society in the name of
research and the soc ial good:
[The private researcher) ... will determine whether his research should be
totally utilitarian, providing the greatest good to the greatest number even if
it may compromise the rights of some individuals . . . (p. 133).
While there is an important relationship and interdependence of the individual
person and the community, the former cannot simply be subordinated to the
latter. Society exists for individuals, so that each person can more readily work
out his or her own eternal destiny.
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Because the reviewer cannot claim any expertise in the field of law , he cannot
critique the legal dimensions of this work in any adequate way. The book appears
to have been done in stages in such a way that newer material was added to
certain chapters and not to others. Although the book has a copyright of 1981, it
does not include, for example, a reference to the birth of Louise Brown, the
world's first known "test tube baby," in July of 1978.
Some of the author's statements on genetics are not quite correct. On page
120, he brings up the issue of the XYY chromosome and states that evidence
suggests it is related to increased aggression. From this, then, he raises the question of whether this information should be communicated to the child. However,
more recent studies have indicated that the only factor which seems to be definitely correlated with the XYY chromosome is an increased stature, rather than
an increased aggression. (See Thaddeus E. Kelly, M.D., Clinical Genetics and
Genetic Counseling, [New York Medical Publishers, 1980], p. 155.)
Unfortunately, Professor Smith seems to make errors fairly easily. His very first
footnote to the introduction mistitles the work of Andre Hellegers , calling it
"Problems of Bioethics" when the actual title is "Problems for Bioethics" and
refers to the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith as the Sacred
College on the Doctrine of Faith (p. 3).
Professor Smith also has the habit, apparently, of making sweeping generalizations. For example, "extraordinary measures undertaken to prolong a life of
suffering is unjust to the individual in question and to the societal standard of
decency and humanity" (p. 9). He does not explain what he means by extraordinary measures, either in that paragraph or subsequently. In view of the fact
that in ethical discussions the question of extraordinary measures has played an
important role, it is surprising that he does not take more care in describing what
he means. Extraordinary measures could mean measures or procedures which are
heroic, experimental, untried, hazardous, or they could mean, as used in ethical
literature, procedures which do not hold out the reasonable hope of benefit or
which would place an excessive burden on the patient. These are significantly
different meanings of the expression "extraordinary" measures which must be
kept in mind. Furthermore, merely to say that extraordinary measures to prolong
a life of suffering are unjust to the individual, does not sufficiently rec ognize the
fact that the patient may choose to continue living in spite of the suffering.
Professor Smith seems to ignore the fact that suffering can be controlled by a
combination of environment and appropriate m edications, such as is done in
hospices.
Chapter IX raises the question of science and religion and seems to be replete
with unsupported assertions. For example, he writes, "Yet, there has been a prolonged conflict between religion and science" (p. 153). As a reference for this he
refers - without quotation - to Bertrand Russell's Religion and Science, published in 1935. Smith goes on to say, "Perhaps one of the basic reasons for the
built-in conflict has been the difference in focus of religious creed and scientific
theory" (p. 153). To say "built-in conflict" is to assert that there is an incompatibility which is rooted in the very nature of religion and science. Such an assertion
would require a good deal more than merely a footnote reference. What is freely
asserted can be freely denied.
The author's statement regarding religion, again, is another sweeping generalization:
Religion, to a considerable extent, consists in the way of feeling sometimes
more than a set of beliefs. The beliefs are secondary or supportive of these
feelings. There are some things people believe, then, because they feel as
though they are true; and such feelings and beliefs are a source of mystery
and incomprehensibility to the scientific mind. Faith is an unknown and
rather primitive principle to the scientist (p. 153).
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This sort of statement reflects what one would expect from an adolescent who
has just discovered that he or she has a mind. One could point to a number of
scientists of eminent stature, down the ages to the present, who were also persons
of faith: Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Newton, Pasteur, Planck, etc.
The author makes a statement regarding the Roman Catholic religion and its
constant teachings regarding "the sanctity of creation." However, he fails to state
what he means by "sanctity of creation," an expression which he uses periodically in his book. One persistent difficulty in his discussIOn 01 religion and science
seems to be that he clumps all religious beliefs into one collection basket. Anyone
with a knowledge of religions would recognize that there are clear differences
among the world religions as well as within each.
The author seems to contradict himself. On page 153 he says, "Yet, there has
been a prolonged conflict between religion and science. Perhaps one of the basic
reasons for the built-in conflict has been the difference in focus of religious creed
and scientific theory." Later, he states, "Viewed modernly, between the statement of theological principle and the scientific method of inquiry of investigation
there is really no conflict because there is no interrelationship or mutual
dependence" (p. 154).
In representing the Catholic view on certain aspects central to the consideration of his work, the author writes,
The Church then, thus, stresses the fact that coition be recognized solely as
an act designed for procreation . . . (p. 155 , emphasis added).
Certainly this statement is deficient in that it fails to recognize the Church's
official teaching that marriage is not only for procreation but also for the bonding
and perfection of the husband and wife :
Marriage is not, then, the effect of chance or the product of evolution or
unconscious natural forces; it is the wise institution of the Creator to realize
in mankind a design of love. By means of the reciprocal personal gift as self,
proper and exclusive to them, husband and wife tend toward the communion of their beings in view of mutual personal perfection, to collaborate
with God in the generation and education of new lives (Pope Paul VI,
Humanae Vitae, no. 8).
The same theme has been repeated in many ways by the present pope, John Paul II.
The author has apparently read widely, at least as reflected in the copious
references cited in his notes for each chapter, but makes free generalizations
which he supports by a reference often not without any quotation, so that there is
no way of determining to what extent the person he cites supports the position he
takes.
Finally, an observation or two need to be made with regard to the physical
aspects of the book. This hardbound book has 64 pages of actual text, 102 pages
of notes and references, and 70 pages devoted to 10 appendices. A brief (four
pages) index is included. The body of the book is apparently reproduced from a
typed manuscript which, unfortunately, was made from a small (about eight
point) elite type with too much letter-and-word spacing for the size of the characters. The result is that it makes for difficult reading . This reviewer felt as if his
eyeballs were being stretched, as well as his credulity.
The book is not recommended for a newcomer who is seeking to know something about genetics, ethics and the law. It may be of interest to someone already
familiar with the interaction of genetics, ethics and the law, who wishes to see
what can happen if a purely secular and pragmatic ethic is applied to genetics.
- Albert Moraczewski, O.P.
Pope John XXIII Center
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